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Location and the 
Low-Income Experience
Analyses of Program Dynamics in the Iowa 
Family Investment Program
Helen H. Jensen, Shao-Hsun Keng, and Steven Garasky
Iowa State University
In 1993, the state of Iowa, through waivers, implemented reforms
creating the Family Investment Program (FIP), a program similar to the
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) created under the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA).  The goals of FIP (helping program recipients leave
poverty and become self-supporting) parallel the intent of TANF and
PRWORA (Holcomb et al. 1998; Iowa Department of Human Services
1996).  FIP merged and coordinated several existing programs and tied
support for job training, education, child care, and transportation more
directly to income transfers.  Iowa has had to change FIP very little to
meet current federal guidelines.  Thus, Iowa provides over seven years
of experience under a program with rules and incentives similar to
those instituted nationwide in 1996.  
The federal changes to welfare policies and programs raise ques-
tions about how rural families receiving assistance are faring under
work requirements and time limits on cash assistance.  Not well under-
stood is whether rural welfare recipients face a more difﬁcult transition
from welfare to sustained employment given the challenges facing
some rural areas.  
This chapter examines the dynamics of welfare participation dur-
ing the pre-TANF period of Iowa’s reform (1993–1995), and speciﬁcal-
ly how program, demographic, and macroeconomic factors relate to re-
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turn to welfare after leaving among program participants.  Reasons for
returning to welfare are examined over time, with speciﬁc attention
given to local labor market conditions and to metropolitan and non-
metropolitan locations (various classiﬁcations).  Iowa received a waiv-
er to enact many of the key provisions of TANF during the period of
our study, including provisions to encourage recipients to enter job
training and the labor market.  We use a unique data set composed of
linked state administrative records.  These data are ideal for longitudi-
nal analyses (analyses spanning a period of time, rather than a cross
section at a point in time) because key variables are available monthly.
The data can also track location (including location changes) among
the FIP households. 
We ﬁrst provide some background to Iowa’s welfare program, re-
view previous research, and discuss the aspects of geographic differ-
ences that may inﬂuence the FIP experience.  Next, we outline the main
features of the administrative data and discuss the beneﬁts and draw-
backs of using administrative data for research purposes.  We then de-
scribe the dynamics of FIP participation.  We develop a model and ex-
amine the distribution of the ﬁrst exit from cash assistance and
incidence of returning to welfare.  We conclude by drawing several pol-
icy implications from our ﬁndings.
BACKGROUND
Throughout the 1990s, rural states enjoyed the beneﬁts of a
healthy economy.  In Iowa in the latter half of the decade, for example,
the statewide unemployment rate remained well below the national
rate: 95 of the 99 Iowa counties had unemployment rates below the na-
tional rate of 4.1 percent in 1999.  Iowa’s economic success, however,
was not uniform across the state.  County-level unemployment rates in
Iowa in 1999 ranged from 1.7 percent (Warren County) to 4.5 percent
(Butler County); among the seven counties with the highest unem-
ployment rates, all but one was predominantly rural (Iowa Department
of Workforce Development 2000).  In the more rural counties, manu-
facturing jobs have absorbed much of the workforce leaving farming.
However, since 1993, most of Iowa’s population growth has been in
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the state’s 10 metropolitan counties (Eathington, Swenson, and Otto
2000).  
During the 1990s, caseloads for Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC)—later FIP—and the Food Stamp program both
peaked around the time of the FIP waiver implementation.  Since early
1994, the caseloads for both programs have declined relatively steadily
(Figure 6.1). Interestingly, while nonmetro unemployment rates in
Iowa remain generally higher than metro rates, both nonmetro and
metro counties have seen similar reductions in cash assistance and
Food Stamp program participation.  
Most studies of former welfare recipients have found that between
half and three-quarters of parents are employed shortly after they leave
the welfare rolls (Parrott 1998).  However, wages are low, typically less
than $8.00 per hour and often less than $6.00 per hour.  As a result,
studies measuring earnings over three-month periods ﬁnd earnings lev-
els well below poverty.  
Much of the policy debate over welfare reform has centered on the
plight of poor urban families.  Although poverty has become more ur-
Figure 6.1  AFDC/TANF and Food Stamp Caseloads in Iowa, 1990–98 
SOURCE: Iowa Department of Human Services.
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banized over the past several decades, most poor and welfare recipient
families live outside central cities, and many live outside metropolitan
areas altogether.  Some evidence suggests that rural workers may face
substantially greater employment and self-sufﬁciency barriers than ur-
ban workers.  In nonmetropolitan areas, poor families are already more
likely to be working and more likely to be underemployed (working
part-time, earning low wages, or unemployed) than are poor families in
metro areas (Findeis and Jensen 1998).  In Iowa, average nonfarm earn-
ings in rural counties are below those in metropolitan and other non-
metropolitan counties (i.e., urban nonmetropolitan areas).  Nationwide,
average rural manufacturing earnings are 68 percent below national
levels; in the service sector, rural earnings are 49 percent of the U.S. av-
erage (Eathington, Swenson, and Otto 2000).  
The majority of the early literature ﬁnds that lower participation
rates in and higher exit rates from cash assistance programs are associ-
ated with greater nonwage income, higher wage rates, more years of
schooling, fewer children, good health, and being white.  Moreover,
these studies also show a “negative duration dependence”; that is, as
the time on welfare lengthens, exit rates decline; and the longer a per-
son remains off assistance, the lower the likelihood that they will re-
turn.  
Mofﬁtt (1992), reviewing the concepts and measures of welfare de-
pendence, found that the most common deﬁnition of welfare depen-
dence focuses on the length of a single welfare spell but does not con-
sider the high reentry rates among welfare recipients.  Important
determinants of returns to welfare include less education, not being
married, and having little job experience (Sandefur and Cook 1997;
Brandon 1995).  Cao’s (1996) analyses indicated that initial welfare de-
pendency and return to welfare for those who have left are correlated
with the recipient’s age, years of education, marital status, ethnic ori-
gin, and region.
Born et al. (1998), in preliminary analyses of administrative data
from the Maryland Family Investment Program, found that nearly 20
percent of cases were reopened within the ﬁrst 3–6 months after exit.
Reentry rates were lowest among women who left for a job (versus
leaving because of marriage, for example).  Born and colleagues also
found that women whose exits were short-lived tended to have younger
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children than those women who managed to remain off the program.
Reidy (1998) examined the role of noncash beneﬁts for those leaving
AFDC.  One result is that those who leave AFDC but continue to claim
noncash beneﬁts (including food stamps) are more likely to return to
AFDC than others who leave both AFDC and other noncash beneﬁt
programs at the same time.  
The limited information on differences between rural and urban ar-
eas in welfare participation (e.g., Porterﬁeld 1998) shows that those in
urban areas have longer spells on welfare than those in rural or smaller
urban locations.  Different labor market opportunities, household and
individual characteristics (including human capital differences) as well
as costs of working (i.e., logistics of transportation or child care ser-
vices) are possible reasons for these differences.  The shorter spells on
welfare in rural areas may also be due to lack of program information
and stigma attached to public assistance (Porterﬁeld 1998).  Porterﬁeld
also found that rural families (relative to urban) are more likely to enter
welfare due to decreases in earnings or income, but urban families are
more likely to exit welfare owing to earnings or increases in income.  
Metro and nonmetro areas may differ in labor market and job op-
portunities.  Davis, Connolly, and Weber (1999) pointed to the spatial
mismatch that has occurred as seekers of jobs in small markets meet
with less success and employers in other markets have a difﬁcult time
ﬁnding the types of employees they need.  The greater prevalence of
underemployment in nonmetro areas, typiﬁed by low-wage employ-
ment, involuntary part-time work, or “discouraged” workers, may ex-
plain part of the inconsistency between relatively low unemployment
rates in many areas and continued low incomes (Findeis and Jensen
1998).  
The current study examines the effects and outcomes of an assis-
tance program quite similar to the TANF programs that have been es-
tablished in many states.  The early experiences with FIP in Iowa allow
us to examine the experiences of individuals and families who left FIP
in the two-year period following its introduction.  We study why some
low-income households successfully leave public assistance while oth-
ers who leave return.  We examine a speciﬁc set of families that were
enrolled and active in FIP at the time of the newly enacted changes in
the system.
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DATA
Iowa was one of the ﬁrst states to link administrative data across
programs to support program administration and policy analysis.  In
1995, a project was designed to develop administrative data systems
for research purposes.  The product of this effort was a three-year lon-
gitudinal data ﬁle (April 1993–March 1996) that matches and merges
FIP, Medicaid, food stamps, child support, and quarterly earnings
records for all FIP recipients during this period.  FIP, food stamps, and
Medicaid represent the key assistance programs for low-income fami-
lies; child support and earnings are the key sources of nonpublic assis-
tance income.  The data include amounts (e.g., program beneﬁts, child
support received, and earnings) and dates (e.g., program exit and re-
entry).  Because the data are not subject to problems of respondent re-
call or respondent bias, administrative data are preferred over survey
data in many respects.  The data are linked for all residents receiving
FIP in April 1993.  Observations (cases) are added to the ﬁle as they en-
ter FIP; cases are followed throughout the data period, even after exit-
ing FIP.
We supplement the administrative data in two ways.  First, we clas-
sify each county as metro (counties in metropolitan areas); urban non-
metro (nonmetro counties with at least one urban population of 20,000
or more); small town/rural adjacent (counties with no urban population
more than 20,000 and adjacent to a metro area); or small town/rural
nonadjacent (counties not adjacent to a metro area).  All categories are
derived from Butler and Beale (1994).  The last three categories can be
combined into a nonmetro group.  Second, we merge monthly county
unemployment rates and county income per capita to account for the
effect of local economic conditions in our analyses.  Monthly county
unemployment rates are available from Iowa Workforce Development.
We create a two-year panel data set, beginning in October 1993
(the start of the FIP program) and ending September 1995.  All cases
identiﬁed as receiving FIP beneﬁts in October 1993 (N = 38,632) are
included in the panel.  No samples are drawn for these analyses.  We
count 22,080 FIP exits among the cases, where an exit is deﬁned as be-
ing inactive (i.e., no beneﬁts) for two months in a row.  After deleting
cases with missing information other than educational attainment, the
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total is reduced to 32,309 cases.  Of these, 17,159 (53 percent) were
metro cases and 15,150 (47 percent) were nonmetro cases. 
Although the Iowa linked data set includes detailed information on
child support collections, FIP participation, and quarterly wage earn-
ings, the household and demographic variables are limited.  Available
information includes the case head’s educational attainment, age, mari-
tal status, ethnic origin, gender, disability status, and county of resi-
dence.  The number of children in the household also is available.  
Unfortunately, it is not mandatory to provide educational attain-
ment when applying for FIP, and about half of our observations have
missing data on education.  Further, the missing data are not randomly
distributed throughout the data set.  Because deleting nonrandom miss-
ing data would lead to biased estimates and a loss of information, we
employed a multiple imputation procedure (Rubin 1987) to compensate
for the missing educational attainment data.  The multiple imputations
ﬁnd that, for the two-year period, there were 6,593 (40.5 percent) cases
with no high school degree, 9,436 (57.9 percent) cases with at least a
high school degree for two years, and 270 (1.6 percent) cases that ex-
perienced a change in education (received a high school degree) some
time during the two-year period.
FIP PARTICIPATION
We next examine how the families fared during the initial period of
the FIP program and whether there were differences in how the families
fared in metro and nonmetro areas.  As noted, the data are on cases ac-
tive in October 1993.  Across the two-year period, the overall FIP case-
load initially increased and then fell.  Some evidence suggests that the
initial caseload increase resulted from the more generous FIP income
disregards and the stronger support programs that were introduced in
1993 (Fraker et al. 1998). 
Table 6.1 provides descriptive information on FIP cases, both total
and divided by metro and nonmetro areas.  Several economic and pro-
gram variables are compared between December 1993 (the end of ﬁrst
quarter) and September 1995 (the end of the last quarter).  Just over
half of the total 32,309 cases were in metro areas.  Of the cases, 91 per-
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Table 6.1  Selected Demographic Variables for Metro and Nonmetro FIP Cases, 
Dec. 1993 and Sept. 1995
Total Metro cases Nonmetro cases
Variables
Dec. 
1993
Sept.
1995
Dec. 
1993
Sept.
1995
Dec. 
1993
Sept.
1995
Quarterly wage income ($) 2,998 3,883 2,781 3,575 3,223 4,207
Share with quarterly wage income (%) 55 69 52 67 58 72
Quarterly child support ($) 164 459 162 435 166 480
Share with quarterly child support (%) 29 36 26 32 32 41
Share of FIP participation (%) 100 50 100 51 100 49
Share receiving food stamps (%) 89 55 90 57 87 53
Number of children 2.20 2.27 2.2 2.31 2.14 2.23
Share living in metro counties (%) 53 53 100 97 0 4
Local unemployment rate (%) 3.74 3.26 3.48 2.97 4.04 3.58
Share with high school degree or above (%) 61 63 58 61 64 66
Share married (%) 20 23 15 18 24 29
Share with female head (%) 91 92 89
Share white (%) 85 76 94
Number of observations 32,309 32,309 17,159 17,159 15,150 15,150
NOTE: Tests for the differences between periods show all are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
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cent of the case heads were female.  The nonmetro cases were more
likely to have a case head who was married, was white and who had at
least a high school degree.
In both metro and nonmetro areas, nearly half of the active FIP cas-
es in October 1993 were active at the end of the two-year period (51
percent for metro and 49 percent for nonmetro areas).  Food stamps had
similar participation patterns by September 1995 (57 percent of metro
cases were active and 53 percent of nonmetro cases), although partici-
pation remained slightly higher than the FIP participation.  In the ﬁrst
quarter of the observation period (December 1993), 52 percent in metro
areas and 58 percent in nonmetro areas were earning wage income.
Two years later, nearly two-thirds of the case heads had earnings from
wages, with a slightly higher rate (72 percent) reported for nonmetro
cases.  Among those with wage income, average earnings were higher
in nonmetro areas in both periods.  This suggests a difference in jobs or
a difference in work effort (i.e., more hours worked) by those in non-
metro areas.  
The percentage of cases receiving child support also increased dur-
ing this period; again, a relatively higher share of households in non-
metro areas received child support, and the average amount of child
support received was higher in nonmetro areas.  In both areas, the per-
centage with a high school degree increased, as did the percentage who
reported being married.  In sum, in addition to improvements in the
overall economy during the two-year period (as measured by unem-
ployment rates), other indicators also improved.  
The FIP population is a relatively mobile one: 11.5 percent moved
from their original county of residence at least once during the two-
year period (analysis not shown).  In metro areas, 7 percent of cases
moved to another county; in nonmetro areas, 16.6 percent of cases
moved.  Of those who moved from the metro area, nearly 22 percent
had moved back to the original county at the end of two years, com-
pared with nearly 15 percent of those in nonmetro counties.  The evi-
dence suggests that FIP recipients in metro areas are more likely to stay
(or return) to their “home” county compared with nonmetro recipients.
(Of course, they may move within the county, and the metro areas have
more housing and different location options.  We were unable to evalu-
ate this possibility.  Also, there is greater availability of public housing
options in metro areas.)  
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If labor resources were fully mobile, we would expect that as FIP
participants moved to obtain a job, their FIP status would change.
Table 6.2 shows the FIP status before and after moving to another coun-
ty for metro and nonmetro moves during the period.  The FIP status
during the quarter preceding each move was compared with the FIP sta-
tus during the ﬁrst quarter in the new location (each observation is a
move).  There were 5,068 moves in total, 1,629 with metro as the orig-
inal county of residence and 3,439 with nonmetro as the originating
county.  For those originally living in metro counties, moves were
evenly distributed between moves to metro and to nonmetro locations.
Relatively more active cases stayed active and inactive cases stayed in-
Table 6.2  FIP and Employment Status after Moving to Another County,
Oct. 1998–Sept. 1995
To metro To nonmetro
Active Inactive Active Inactive
Moves from metro (N=1,629)
Active 100 52 116 44
% employed before 66 54 66 61
% employed after move 75 75 69 66
Inactive 72 562 75 608
% employed before 68 48 61 53
% employed after move 75 65 76 69
Total (percent of total) 172 (11) 614 (38) 191 (12) 652 (40)
% employed before 67 49 64 54
% employed after move 75 66 72 69
Moves from nonmetro (N=3,439)
Active 114 68 353 199
% employed before 70 60 62 69
% employed after move 79 69 74 74
Inactive 64 577 224 1,840
% employed before 69 53 67 59
% employed after move 78 71 80 76
Total (percent of total) 178 (5) 645 (19) 577 (17) 2,039 (59)
% employed before 70 54 64 59
% employed after move 79 71 77 76
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active, irrespective of the destination county type.  For those originally
living in nonmetro counties, over three-fourths (17 percent and 60 per-
cent) of cases moved to nonmetro areas.  Again, the moves were not as-
sociated with big shifts in FIP status.  
A relatively large share of moves resulted in employment in the
quarter after the move, as shown in Table 6.2.  Despite the status in FIP,
nearly three-fourths of moves had case heads employed after the move,
although the employment rates varied among the different groups
shown in the table.  Nearly 69 percent of moves from metro counties
were employed after the move, compared with 75 percent of moves
from nonmetro counties.  The highest rates of employment after the
move was for moves from nonmetro counties to nonmetro counties.
One caveat to these results is that there is some lag in employment re-
porting in the system.  
We next examined the time spent (in months) receiving FIP in each
of the two years (1993 and 1995).1 In metro areas, 15.6 percent of re-
cipients had relatively short spells during the ﬁrst year (0–6 months on
FIP in the ﬁrst year); 64.3 percent remained on FIP during the full 12
months.  The distribution of cases is similar for nonmetro areas, with
slightly more (17.1 percent) receiving assistance for 6 months or fewer,
and 61 percent remaining on for the full ﬁrst 12 months.  
The extremes in our data are those who do not participate in FIP at
all during the second year (“long-term leavers”), and those who partic-
ipate in FIP all 24 months observed (the “hard-core”).  Approximately
one-fourth (24.4 percent) of all metro cases and a slightly larger per-
centage of the nonmetro cases did not participate in FIP at all during the
second year.  In contrast, 38 percent of metro cases and 35 percent of
nonmetro cases remained on FIP all 24 months of the two-year period. 
Table 6.3 compares differences in the groups among the four geo-
graphic locations between the beginning and the end months of the
two-year period.  To start, we compare those not participating in FIP
in the second year across the four geographic areas.  For this group,
employment rates (receipt of wage income) were relatively high (rang-
ing from 74 percent to 84 percent) during both years, although in all
areas, the percentage with wage income fell between the ﬁrst and sec-
ond year.  This may be because of increases in marriage rates or child
support for this group.  The highest rates of employment were in the
small towns/rural adjacent areas, areas that have beneﬁted from strong
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Table 6.3  Comparison of Selected Demographic Variables for Different Locations and Participation Patterns: 
Oct. 1993 to Sept. 1995 (October 1993 base year)
Metro Urban nonmetro
No partic. in 2nd yr. 
N = 4,183 (24.4%)
Participate all 24 mos.
N = 6,541 (38.1%)
No partic. in 2nd yr. 
N = 1,356 (24.8%)
Participate all 24 mos.
N = 2,035 (37.2%)
Variables Yr. 1 Yr. 2 Yr. 1 Yr. 2 Yr. 1 Yr. 2 Yr. 1 Yr. 2
Annual wage income  ($) 10,478 14,665*** 7,671 8,504*** 11,317 16,119*** 9,148 10,070**
Share employed (%) 79 74*** 63 74*** 79 78 66 77***
Annual child support ($) 1,323 2,279*** 377 394*** 1,419 2,381*** 372 391**
Share having child support (%) 42 43 38 40*** 48 51 42.9 47.7***
Share with food stamps (%) 88 26*** 93 92** 88 28%*** 93.5 93.8
Number of children 2.04 2.04 2.33 2.44*** 2.01 2.01 2.22 2.32**
Share high school or abovea (%) 61 63* 56 58** 65 67 60 61
Share married (%) 19 20 13.2 13 23 25 21.7 22
Quarters worked 2.50 2.62*** 1.85 2.24*** 2.53 2.77*** 1.95 2.38***
Proportion w/move to another
county 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05
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Proportion w/move to another
county 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05
Small town/rural adjacent Small town/rural nonadjacent
No partic. in 2nd yr. 
N = 4,183 (24.4%)
Participate all 24 mos.
N = 6,541 (38.1%)
No partic. in 2nd yr. 
N = 1,356 (24.8%)
Participate all 24 mos.
N = 2,035 (37.2%)
Variables Yr. 1 Yr. 2 Yr. 1 Yr. 2 Yr. 1 Yr. 2 Yr. 1 Yr. 2
Annual wage income  ($) 13,033 17,758*** 9,796 11,176*** 12,578 17,487*** 9,369 10,771***
Share employed (%) 84 81* 69 76*** 82 78** 68 75***
Annual child support ($) 1,430 2,462*** 389 418** 1,409 2,521*** 386 421***
Share having child support (%) 47 49 46 47 54.8 55 47 51**
Share with food stamps (%) 86 30*** 86.9 86.6 85 28*** 89 88
Number of children 2.07 2.1 2.18 2.27* 2.05 2.04 2.2 2.27
Share high school or abovea (%) 68 70 62 65* 70 71 66 68
Share married (%) 28 29 24 24 25 26 24 24
Quarters worked 2.79 2.93** 2.12 2.43*** 2.69 2.81 2.07 2.39***
Proportion w/move to another
county 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10
NOTE: *** = signiﬁcant at the 1% level; ** = signiﬁcant at the 5% level; * = signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
a The average of ﬁve imputation data sets is reported.
Table 6.3  (continued)
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growth in jobs and available jobs in metro areas.  For those earning
wage income, earnings were higher in the second year.  The lowest av-
erage wage income was reported in metro areas.
Child support receipt also increased in all areas among those not
participating in FIP in the second year (Table 6.3).  The average rate of
growth in annual child support was over 68 percent in all of the areas.
Receipt of food stamps decreased, falling from participation levels
above 85 percent in the ﬁrst year to between 26 percent and 30 percent
of cases in the second year.  Note, however, that even with no FIP par-
ticipation, up to 30 percent of the cases received food stamp assistance
in the second year. 
The experience for those on FIP for all 24 months was very differ-
ent.  These cases had lower employment rates, although even during
the ﬁrst year between 63 percent and 69 percent of cases had some
wage income.  The lowest labor force participation rates were reported
in metro areas.  Employment rates rose in the second year, with the
most rapid increases occurring in metro and urban nonmetro counties.
The number of quarters worked also increased for these households.
The annual wage income increased; however, the increase was both at a
level and rate of increase lower than for those who were not receiving
FIP by the second year.  Again, the lowest wage income was reported in
metro areas.  
Rates of child support for the hard core FIP cases increased as well
in all areas.  The annual levels of child support received were greatest
in small town/rural nonadjacent areas.  Food stamp assistance was rela-
tively common, and the highest food stamp participation rates occurred
in metro counties (with rates of 92–93 percent). 
In sum, in all geographic areas, there were changes in labor mar-
ket activity for FIP households during the two-year period: the average
number of quarters worked increased for all groups.  Increased work
by the hard-core group may be attributed to success in meeting FIP’s
program goals.  In looking across geographic areas, the lower wage in-
come levels and child support in metro areas is striking, especially
compared with the two most rural locations.  Among those on FIP for
the full 24 months, those in metro areas received the lowest wage in-
come and near the lowest levels of child support.  Both wages and
child support grew relatively more for those in the two most rural
areas.
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WELFARE EXIT AND RETURN
We next examine return to welfare after leaving by looking at the
duration of the ﬁrst exit spell.  We discuss the methods of analysis in
the following sections.
Deﬁnitions of Variables
We analyze the ﬁrst exit spell to gain a better understanding of rea-
sons for return to welfare.  An exit occurs when a FIP recipient leaves
the program for at least two consecutive months.  Hence, an exit spell
ranges from 2–23 months in our data.  We require two consecutive
months with no FIP beneﬁts to avoid counting individuals as “exiting”
due to administrative delays, or not receiving beneﬁts in the short term
because they are, for example, only eligible for less than $10.2 If the
ﬁrst exit spell lasts only one month, we choose the next valid exit spell.  
There are 18,382 exit spells in our sample of 32,309 cases.  The
distribution of spells for the metro and nonmetro areas are similar.
Twenty-ﬁve percent of the exit spells are complete before the end of
our sample period; the remaining spells are right-censored (that is, we
do not observe a return within the two-year period of the data).  The av-
erage length of all exit spells is 11 months.  The average length of the
complete spell (one observed to begin and end during the 24 months of
data) however, is six months.  This result indicates that, for those who
returned to FIP, the time they are out of the program is relatively short.  
Estimation Procedure
To examine the likelihood of reentry to welfare, we grouped the
exit spells into eight mutually exclusive intervals, based on the length
of the spell.  Each time interval was deﬁned over three months (i.e., 0–3
months, 4–6 months, etc.), and the observation for each interval was
whether the case stayed off of FIP or reentered the program.  For each
time period, we evaluated the likelihood of reentry.  (For more detailed
description of the estimation procedure, see the appendix.)  
This approach allows for the effects of the predictor variables to
vary across time intervals, but it requires the effect to be constant with-
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in the time interval.  The variables that are allowed to vary over time in-
clude quarterly potential wage, quarterly child support collections,
marital status, number of children, an indicator of the food stamp par-
ticipation in the previous quarter, an indicator of the area of residence
(metro county vs. nonmetro county), and the quarterly local unemploy-
ment rate.  Time invariant variables are gender and race (white or non-
white).  
Because wage income is an important predictor of FIP participa-
tion, and because decisions regarding labor force and FIP participation
are jointly determined, we use an instrumental variable approach to
control for the endogeneity.  The observed wage income in the quarter
with highest reported wage income was used in predicting the potential
wage income.  The instruments for the potential wage include age, edu-
cation, local unemployment rate, quarter, gender, income per capita of
the county of residence, share of county population with a college de-
gree, and an indicator of residing in a metro county.
Empirical Results
Based on the analysis of all cases, as well as of metro and nonmetro
cases, we identify several important factors affecting FIP reentry (Table
6.4). First, the effects of some variables are similar across the geo-
graphic areas.  This includes whether the family received food stamps
and the number of children in the household.  The effect of other vari-
ables differed between the two areas, including the effects of demo-
graphics (marital status and gender), local unemployment, and the po-
tential wage.  With the data combined, living in a metro county
decreases likelihood of return to welfare for those who have exited
from cash assistance, although this result is not statistically signiﬁcant.  
For all areas, higher quarterly wage income reduces the likelihood
of return to welfare.  This result is statistically signiﬁcant for all cases
and for nonmetro.  In other words, the chance that a person will return
to cash assistance falls as potential earnings increase.  Similarly, re-
ceiving child support lowers the probability of reentering FIP in a giv-
en interval.  The magnitude of the estimated effects indicates that child
support is more important in remaining off welfare than wage income.
Interestingly, a higher (current) unemployment rate does not increase
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Table 6.4  Estimated Coefﬁcients of Likelihood to Return to Welfare,
Oct. 1993–Sept. 1995
Independent variablesa All cases Metro cases
Nonmetro
cases
Potential (predicted) wage –0.06** –0.04 –0.07**
Child support –0.52*** –0.55*** –0.49***
Local unemployment rate –0.02 0.03 –0.04**
Receipt of food stamps (0,1) 0.61*** 0.62** 0.6**
White (0,1) 0.02 0.0003 0.12
Married (0,1) –0.02 –0.13** 0.06
Male (0,1) –0.16*** –0.23** –0.11*
Number of children 0.1*** 0.089*** 0.1***
Metro location –0.06
Number of observations 18,382 9,492 8,890
NOTE: *** = signiﬁcant at the 1% level; ** = signiﬁcant at the 5% level; 
* = signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
a Binary variables for the time periods were also included; all were statistically signif-
icant.
the probability of reentry.  The estimated effect is statistically signiﬁ-
cant only for nonmetro areas.  
Receiving food stamps in the previous quarter is positively associ-
ated with return to FIP.  This result is consistent with that found by Rei-
dy (1999) in Illinois.  The result suggests that the Food Stamp program
provides a safety net for those most at risk of return to FIP.  Being mar-
ried decreases the likelihood of returning to FIP in metro areas; the ef-
fect is not statistically signiﬁcant in nonmetro areas.  Cases headed by
men are less likely to return to FIP than are those headed by women,
and this effect is stronger in metro than in nonmetro areas.  Race does
not affect the reentry rates.  As would be expected, families with more
children are more likely to return to welfare.  
Figure 6.2 shows the predicted reentry rate over the length of an
exit spell.  The rate is estimated at the sample means of the explanatory
variables.  The predicted reentry rate decreases as the exit spell length-
ens, supporting other studies that show a negative relationship between
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Figure 6.2  Predicted Likelihood of Reentry by County of Residence 
the reentry rate and length of the time off of assistance.  In the ﬁrst
quarter, the probability of return is 9.3 percent in metro areas and 10.1
percent in nonmetro areas.  By the end of the sixth quarter, the likeli-
hood decreases to 2.9 percent for metro areas and 3 percent in non-
metro cases.  The probability of return falls throughout the spell (except
the last quarter).  Although the rates differ in the ﬁrst quarters, when
metro cases are less likely to return than those in nonmetro areas, for
longer spells, the chance of return is very similar.  
DISCUSSION
We examined the dynamics of welfare participation and the initial
experience of welfare reforms in Iowa.  More than 60 percent of the
FIP recipients we followed in this study left the program at some point
during the two-year period.  Although improvements in the Iowa econ-
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omy account for a share of the exits, our results provide some evidence
that Iowa’s reform of its welfare program may have helped reduce the
FIP caseloads as well.  Differences were also evident between metro
and nonmetro areas.
The analysis shows that between the ﬁrst and last quarters in the
study period, some of the households saw marked economic improve-
ments.  Higher earnings were found for many in nonmetro areas.  Food
assistance programs continued to offer assistance to the households and
seemed especially important during periods of transition.  However,
many of those receiving support from the Food Stamp program re-
turned to FIP.  There was a relatively high degree of mobility among
FIP participants, especially for those in nonmetro areas.  The moves
were not primarily associated with a concurrent departure from FIP. 
What is most apparent, though, is that although some households
are able to leave FIP, others experience greater difﬁculties in achieving
self-sufﬁciency.  Thirty-seven percent of FIP cases in our data remained
on FIP for the full two years.  Several indicators suggest that those in
metro areas in Iowa were more dependent on FIP; they were less likely
to earn wages or collect child support, and they received lower wages
and less child support.  Under TANF, the ﬁve-year lifetime limit on re-
ceiving beneﬁts may affect this group most directly.  They may be with-
out assistance if state governments can exempt only 20 percent of their
caseloads from the time limit, as the federal law requires.  
Looking at the return to welfare by those who left FIP, the data sug-
gest that FIP recipients who returned to the program did so quickly (the
average time off welfare is six months).  Among FIP recipients, those in
metro areas are less likely to leave FIP compared with those in non-
metro areas, but once they leave, metro recipients are less likely to re-
turn right away.  The multivariate analysis of likelihood of return to FIP
shows that, after the ﬁrst two quarters, there is little difference in the
likelihood of returning between metro and nonmetro locations.  
The reasons for the differences (and similarities) are likely to be
complex, and we are only beginning to understand the experience of
those who leave FIP (and food stamps) through closer examination of
administrative and survey data.  Characteristics of the “leavers,” as
they are called, may differ across geographic areas.  Perhaps metro re-
cipients do not leave FIP until they have very good economic pros-
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pects.  Once they have left, they remain off FIP longer and are less like-
ly to return immediately.  There may also be differences in nonpartici-
pation among those eligible for FIP; administrative data can provide
only very limited evidence of this.  
The lessons learned here provide a preliminary indication of what
we can expect from a state TANF program.  Iowa’s experience suggests
that human capital, marriage, child support, and the number of children
are major determinants of welfare dependence.  Food assistance pro-
grams provide signiﬁcant support to those most at economic risk.  Pro-
grams and policies designed to enhance education, encourage marriage,
provide and impose job training and job search, and further enforce
child support are likely to be most effective in helping families achieve
economic self-sufﬁciency, in both metro or nonmetro areas.  
The empirical analyses for this study were conducted using state
administrative data.  Having the opportunity to use administrative data
for research is a mixed blessing.  These data allowed for analyses that
could not have been conducted with survey data.  On the other hand,
they have their own challenges and limitations relative to survey data
that cannot be ignored.  We addressed one of these challenges—the
problem of missing data for a key explanatory variable (educational at-
tainment)—in detail in another study (Keng, Garasky, and Jensen
2000).  Here, we took advantage of the ability to track location change
and the dynamics of active program participation.  Research based on
administrative data complements traditional survey-based research.
Notes
1. Note that our data are left censored.  That is, we do not have information about the
case and case members prior to April 1993.  Further, for these analyses, we do not
make use of information prior to the start of the FIP program, October 1993.
2. Program rules are such that an FIP program participant eligible for a cash beneﬁt of
less than $10 in a given month does not receive a cash beneﬁt that month, but con-
tinues to remain eligible for, and must participate in, all other aspects of the pro-
gram as if she or he had received a cash beneﬁt.
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APPENDIX
ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
A semiparametric proportional hazard model with time-varying covari-
ates is applied to our grouped duration data (Prentice and Gloeckler 1978;
Kiefer 1990).  The advantage of the semiparametric method is that the baseline
hazard is nonparametric and is estimated along with the coefﬁcients of the ex-
planatory variables using a maximum likelihood procedure.  We grouped the
exit spells by duration into eight mutually exclusive time intervals: that is,
reentry occurs in one of the following intervals [0, 4), [4, 7), . . . , [22, ∞),
where a month is the unit of the measurement.  The exit intervals are deﬁned as
[0, a1), [a1, a2), . . . , [ai, ∞).  The probability of an exit spell ending in interval
i is equivalent to the probability that a spell survives to interval i – 1 and fails
in interval i.  Hence, the probability is given by
(1) Prob(ai–1 ≤ T < ai) = (1 – Pai) 
i–1
j=1
Pj,
where j = 1, . . . , 7.
We treat survival or failure (reentry) in each time interval as an observa-
tion.  As a result, each FIP case contributes i observations to the likelihood
function where i is the interval in which reentry takes place.  For exit spells
censored in a given interval, we assume that censoring occurs at the beginning
of the interval.  Given a sample with N individuals, where k = 1, . . . , N, the
likelihood function is given as
(2) L(θ) = 
N
k=1
(1 – Paik)d 
i–1
j=1
Pajk,
where d = 0 if the individual is still at risk and d = 1 if reentry oc-
curs.
To estimate the likelihood function, we use a proportional hazard function
λ(t,Xt) = λ0(t)φ(β,Xt), where λ0(t) is the baseline hazard function, φ(β,Xt) =
exp(β′Xt), β is a vector of coefﬁcients, and Xt is a set of regressors.  Instead of
specifying the functional form for the baseline hazard, the semiparametric
method estimates the baseline hazard function for each time interval.  The re-
sulting log likelihood function can be rewritten as follows:
(3) logL * (θ) = 
N
k=1
{1 – exp[–exp(rik + β′Xtk)]} – 
N
k=1

i–1
j=1
exp(rjk + β′Xjk),
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where θ = (r1, r2, . . . , rm, β)
(4) rik = log[–logδi]
δi = exp– ii–1 λ0(s)ds.
δi is the conditional survival probability in interval i when β′Xi is equal to
zero.
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